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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECXSIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BAGGAGE.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Yazoo and
M. V. R. Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 37 S. 500, that
What memoranda and papers in the possession of anConstitutes agent, but relating exclusively to the business of
his principal, and carried by the agent solely for business
purposes, are not baggage when put by the agent in his
trunk, and, in the absence of a consent or custom of the rail-
road to accept such papers as baggage, no damages can be
recovered, either for the loss of the papers or for delay in
their shipment and delivery. Compare Staub v. Kendrick,
23 N. E. 79,6 L. R. A. 619.
BILLS OF LADING.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, laying down the gen-
eral rule that a bill of lading, though made non-negotiable
Negotiability: by its terms, may, like any other non-negotiable
Rights of instrument or chose in action, be transferred byAssignee assignment, the assignee taking subject to the
equities between the original parties, holds in National Bank
of Bristol v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 59 Atl. 134 , that anassignee of a non-negotiable bill of lading takes title to the
goods represented by the bill subject only to the equities of
those whose names appear upon or are in some way con-
nected with the bill, and is not affected by equities existing
in favor of strangers whose interests in no way appear
upon it.
BUILDING CONTRACTS.
In Norcross v. Wyman, .72 N. E. 347, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts decides that under a building
Power of contract providing that the decision of the archi-
Architects tects as to the specifications shall be final and
binding, no notice was necessary before making a decision
as to the meaning of the specifications, but the architects
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were at liberty to decide on such legal principles as they
deemed applicable and on such evidence as they chose to
receive.
CARRIERS.
It seems settled by the majority of decisions that where
goods shipped over several connecting lines are injured, and
Presumptions where it appears that they were delivered in
good condition to the first carrier, injury is pre-
sumed to have occurred on the last carrier's line. On the
other hand, where the goods are entirely lost the burden is in
the first carrier to explain such loss. An interesting set of
facts is presented in Bullock v. Boston and H. Dispatch Co.,
72 N. E. 256, where a case containing goods Was delivered
in good order to an initial carrier. When the connecting
carrier delivered it to the owner it was found that some of
the goods had been removed and were lost. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that the loss is pre-
sumed to have occurred on the line of the connecting carrier.
Compare Moore v. Railroad, 173 Mass. 335.
The Supreme Court of Kansas decides in levons v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 78 Pac. 817, that where a railroad ticket cor-
Railroad rectly recites the date of its issuance, but is
Ticket: marked with a punch in a manner that, accord-
Consideratiaon ing to its printed statements, indicates that it
had expired prior to that date, it cannot be said as a matter
of law that it is for this reason void, and that its holder may
not recover damages for being expelled from a train when
he presents it for passage. It is also held that a round-trip
railroad ticket, containing provisions that it shall be used
only by the original holder whose signature it bears, but not
in fact signed by anyone, which is sold with the express
understanding that it shall be used by A in going to, and by
B in returning from, the place of destination, is not void
when presented by B upon such return passage after having
been used by A for the first part of the journey. The case
is an interesting authority upon a question upon which there
are not many decisions. Compare Trice v. Chesapeake and
0. Ry. Co., 40 W. Va. 271.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of Washington decides In re Aubry,
78 Pac. 9oo, that the trade of a horseshoer is not a subject
Regulation of of regulation under the police power of the state
Occupation as a business concerning and directly affecting
the health, welfare, and comfort of its inhabitants, and hence
that a statute providing for the examination and registra-
tion of horseshoers in certain cities is unconstitutional as an
illegitimate exercise of such power. It is further held that
the act also deprives citizens of their liberty and property
without due process of law, and denies to them the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Compare the recent decision of Bessette
v. People, 193 Ili. 334, 56 L. R. A. 558.
CONTRACTS.
In Board of School Com'rs of City of Indianapolis v.
Bender, 72 N. E. 154, the Appellate Court of Indiana holds
Mistake: that where a bidder for a public building, having
Right to very little time after notice of the letting of the
Rescind contract, and before the filing of the bids, in
making up his bid from his estimate book, in which he had
estimated the different parts of the work separately, by mis-
take turned two leaves and omitted an estimate on one part
of the work, in consequence of which his bid as submitted
was several thousand dollars lower than he intended, or for
which the work could be done, the acceptance of such bid did
not create a contract for want of the meeting of the minds
of the parties; and the mistake being an excusable one, a
complaint setting up such fact, and that he promptly noti-
fied the board having charge of the work of the mistake, and
the contract was let to the next higher bidder, states a cause
of action in equity for the rescission of his bid and the recov-
ery of a deposit made as a guarantee that he would enter
into a contract if his bid was accepted. See in connection
with this case Harran v. Foley, 62 Wis. 584.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department) decides in Johnson v. Fargo, 90 N. Y.
725, that a contract made between employer and
wVaity employee at the time of the employment of the
latter, whereby he agreed to assume all risks of accident or
injury which he would sustain in the course of his employ-
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ment, whether occasioned by the negligence of the employer
or any of its agents or employees, or otherwise, and further
providing that in case he should at any time suffer injury
he would at once execute and deliver to the employer a re-
lease of all claims, demands, and causes of action arising out
of or connected with such injury, is contrary to public policy
and void. One judge dissents. Compare Purdy v. Rail-
road Co., 125 N. Y. 209.
An interesting decision by the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, Second Department) appears in Jacobs
Restraint o v. Cohen, 90 N. Y. Supp. 854, where it is held
Trade that a contract between an employer and a labor
union, providing that the employer shall not employ any help
other than those who are members of the union, and who
conform to the rules of the union, and providing that the
employer shall cease to employ employees who are not in
good standing on being notified to that effect by the repre-
sentatives of the union, and providing that the employer
shall abide by the rules of the union, is an attempt to restrict
the freedom of employment and is void as against public
policy. Two judges dissent. Compare Curran v. Galen,
152 N. Y. 33.
DAMAGES.
The Supreme Court of Utah decides in Nichols v. Oregon
Short Line R. Co., 78 Pac. 866, that in an action for injuries
Impairment to a passenger resulting from a collision, a loss
of Memory of memory and an impairment of plaintiff's men-
tal power are proper elements of damage. Compare with
this decision the very recent holding of the Supreme Court
of Oregon in Maynard v. Oregon R. and Nay. Co., 78 Pac.
983, that mental distress or anguish resulting from the real-
ization of physical inability, because of the injury, to prop-
erly care for those dependent on plaintiff for support and
education is not an element of consequential damages to be
recovered in an action for personal injuries.
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FIRE INSURANCE.
In Fuller v. Jameson, 90 N. Y. 456, the New York Su-
preme Court (Appellate Division, First Department) decides
Change of that a bankruptcy adjudication against insured,
Interest and a note by the referee in bankruptcy in his
record of the name of the person whom he had selected as
receiver to take charge of his property pending the appoint-
ment of a trustee, and an order appointing the receiver and
his qualification two days after the destruction of the prop-
erty covered by the policy, did not constitute such a change
of interest as to invalidate the policy under a provision that
it should be void if any change other than by the death of
the insured should take place in the interest, title, or pos-
session of the subject of insurance, etc., during the life of the
policy. Compare Rand v. Iowa Central Railroad Co., 89 N.
Y. Supp. 212, a very recent decision referring to a similar
question.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
Just what constitutes the doing of business in a state by a
foreign corporation is frequently a matter of difficulty to
Doing Busi- decide. The United States Circuit Court (E.
ness in State D. New York), dealing with this question, holds
in Honeyinan v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., 133 Fed. 96,
that where a corporation incorporated in another state,
where the business for which it was organized is carried on;
has no office in New York, except for the registration of
transfers of stock, the fact that its directors have met there,
as permitted by a by-law, at the office of one of their number,
and that it keeps a bank account there, do not constitute a
doing of business in the state which renders it subject to suit
therein, it not being shown what business was transacted at
the New York meetings, nor how long since any such meet-
ing was held. Compare with this decision note to Wagner
v. I. & G. Meakin, Limited, 33 C. C. A. 585 .
GIFTS.
In Phinney v. State ex rel. Stratton, 78 Pac. 927, the
Supreme Court of Washington holds that where a man suf-
Mortis Causa fering from a disease which made him believe
that death was impending, having no wife or
children or next of kin or creditors, had a check drawn on
a bank in which he had a deposit in favor of one who had
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for some time been his friend, nurse in sickness, and com-
panion, and handed the check to the payee with the state-
ment: "If I don't get over this, I want (the payee) to get
my money. I don't want it to go" to the county, and died
within a few days thereafter, the delivery of the check was a
valid gift causa mortis and enforceable, though the check
did not reach the bank until after the donor's death and did
not include all of the donor's deposit. Compare Bank v.
Chilberg, 14 Wash. 247. The case presents a very interest-
ing and satisfactory discussion of the principles involved.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
In Stalcup v. Stalcup, 49 S. E. 210, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina decides that a conveyance to husband and
Estate of wife, if nothing else appears, vests in the gran-
Entirety tees an estate in entirety, whether the considera-
tion was furnished partly by both, or all by one of them.
INSURANCE.
Against the dissent of two judges, the New York Su-
preme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department)
capacity ot holds in Reilly v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 90 N.
Agent Y. 866, that an insurance solicitor who takes
an application is the agent of the insurer, notwithstanding
a clause in the contract of insurance providing that the solici-
tor shall be the agent of the insured as to all statements and
answers made in the application; and it is therefore com-
petent, in an action on the policy, to show that the insured
gave truthful answers to the agent, who wrote false answers
in the application.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
The Court of Appeals of New York holds in Steefel v.
Rothschild, 72 N. E. 112, that where a lessor concealed
Defects in defects in a building Which the lessee could
Building not discover by reasonable diligence, it consti-
tuted a fraud; and.where the lessee was compelled to remove
from the building by reason of a judgment obtained by the
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municipal authorities declaring the building unsafe, he could
recover from the lessor the rent paid in advance and the loss
occasioned by such removal. It is further decided that
where a building constitutes a public nuisance, and the lessor
has knowledge thereof before the lessee takes possession, he
must abate the nuisance; and where he permits, with such
knowledge, the lessee to take possession, damages resulting
to the latter therefrom are the direct results of the lessor's
violation of law in maintaining such nuisance and he is lia-
ble to the lessee therefor. Compare Cesar v. Karoutz, 6o
N. Y. 229.
MARRIED WOMEN.
The Indiana statute law provides in a manner similar to
the statute law of most states that a married woman shall not
Contract of enter into any contract of suretyship. In Field
Suretyship v. Campbell, 72 N. E. 260, the Supreme Court
of Indiana holds that whether or not a married woman is a
surety or a principal on any obligation is to be determined
not from the form of a contract but from whether she re-
ceived in person or by benefit to her estate the consideration
on which the contract depends. See, however, Dusenberry
v. Insurance Co., 188 Pa. 460, and Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa.
304, where an apparently different doctrine was established.
MINING CLAIMS.
In Stevens v. Grand Central Min. Co., 133 Fed. 28, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit)
Constructive holds that the general rule that co-tenants stand
Trusts in a relation to one another of mutual trust and
confidence, that one will not be permitted to act in hostility
to the others in respect to the joint estate, and that a distinct
title acquired by one will inure to the benefit of all, applies
with full force to the joint owners of a mining claim; and
a co-owner who amends the location noted, relocates the
claim, or otherwise procures the issuance of a patent in his
own name, will hold the title in trust for all; nor will the
trust be avoided, or its enforcement defeated, merely because
a stranger to the original claim joins with such joint owner
in the relocation and acquires title jointly with him to the
relocated claim.
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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS.
In Wenzel v. Powder, 59 At. 194, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland holds that where a settler provided, in the
what deed creating the trust, that all the income
Constitutes should be applied to the support of himself and
wife and children, the whole income having been given for
the beneficiaries, the income was not inalienable, and hence
a contention that the trust was a spendthrift one and the
income not subject to claims of the creditors of the cestuis
que trustent was of no merit.
TAXATION.
Switches, wires, and meters of an electric lighting com-
pany, installed on property belonging to different individ-
Electric uals, to whom the lighting company was fur-
Meters nishing electricity, are not assessable as real
estate to such company: New York Supreme Court (Spe-
cial Term, Oneida County) in People ex rel. New York
Edison Co. v. Feitner, 90 N. Y. 826.
WILLS.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides in
Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N. E. 499, that a finding that,
Animus before testator and the person who drew his
Testandi will parted when it was executed, testator told
the scrivener that the instrument which had been signed as
and for his* last will, and declared by him to be such in the
scrivener's presence, was a "fake, made for a purpose," was
fatal to the validity of the will. It is further decided that
parol evidence is admissible to contradict the recitals of a
will that it is a will, that it has been signed as such by the
person named as the testator, and attested and subscribed
by persons signing as witnesses.
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